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ABDUCTION BEYOND ITS LIMIT:
UNITED STATES v. ALVAREZ-
MACHAINt
I. INTRODUCTION
As the sun sets over the Getco Publishing Building, a gray
haired man puts his coat on in anticipation of the long train ride
home to his wife and four children. Suddenly, three men
dressed in black carrying sub-machine guns burst into his office
and tackle the man to the ground. As they hold a gun to the
man's head they inform him that he is under arrest by the Ira-
nian government for publishing books that criticize the Islamic
religion.' The three Iranian nationals tie the bewildered man
up and beat him with the shafts of their guns. Bloodied and
semi-conscious, the man is told he will be brought back to Iran
and tried for his "crimes." Sixteen hours later he is smuggled
into Iran, taken into custody, tried for his "crimes" and sen-
tenced to death. In response, the United States State Depart-
ment protests the abduction as a violation of United States
sovereignty. However, their protests are of no use. Iran cites
United States law to justify the extraterritorial abduction. At
6:00 A.M., one day after his trial, the man is taken to a court-
yard and shot by a firing squad. At home his wife and four chil-
dren can only ask why.2
t The author would like to dedicate this article to his parents Joseph and
Mary Miller, for twenty-five years of constant support and inspiration.
1 The Iranian government recently passed a law which authorizes the extra-
territorial abduction of Americans. Richard A. Serrano, Iranian Newspaper Wants
Capt. Rogers Held, Tried, LA TuMEs, Nov. 2, 1989, at B2, Col. 1.
2 This scenario is not unlike that posed by Abraham Abramovsky in Extrater-
ritorial Abductions: America's 'Catch and Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J.
INT'L L. 151 (1991).
1
PACE INT'L L. REV.
It is hard to imagine how such a scenario could occur on
any sovereign's territory. Ironically, this scenario is reminis-
cent of the United States government's actions when it author-
ized Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") agents to enter Mexico,
kidnap Doctor Humberto Alvarez-Machain ("Alvarez"), a Mexi-
can national, and bring him to the United States to stand trial
for murder. The United States Supreme Court subsequently
upheld the government's actions in United States v. Alvarez. 3
In doing so, the Court set a dangerous precedent by providing a
legal basis for extraterritorial abductions.4
This note examines the Court's reasoning in upholding the
legality of Alvarez's abduction. The note submits that the
Court's holding was based on a misapplication of judicial doc-
trines, a misreading of the United States-Mexico Extradition
Treaty and a disregard for the principles of international law.
While the time has not yet come when Iranian terrorists have
invaded United States soil and kidnapped our nationals, the
holding in Alvarez3 establishes a justification for such action.
Part II of this note examines the domestic and interna-
tional principles the Court relied upon in deciding Alvarez.
These include: the Ker-Frisbie doctrine;6 the Principle of Spe-
cialty;7 customary international law;8 basic principles of treaty
interpretation;9 and the United States-Mexico Extradition
Treaty.1 These principles provide a background for analyzing
the Court's decision. Part III contains a detailed discussion of
the Supreme Court's opinion. A critique of this decision follows
in Part IV." Part V concludes that while Alvarez12 may be jus-
3 112 S. Ct. 2188, 119 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1992).
4 For the purposes of this article, extraterritorial abduction refers to the ab-
duction of foreigners beyond the physical and juridical boundaries of a particular
state. See BLAcies LAw DicTioNARY 588 (6th ed. 1990); see also Mitchell J.
Matorin, Unchaining The Law: The Legality of Extraterritorial Abduction In Lieu
.of Extradition, 41 DuKE L.J. 907 (1992).
5 See supra note 3.
6 For discussion see infra notes 13-49 and accompanying text.
7 For discussion see infra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
8 For discussion see infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
9 For discussion see infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
10 For discussion see infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
11 This article will not discuss the due process issues involved in this case.
For a discussion of these principles see generally, Janet E. Mitchell, The Selective
Application Of The Fourth Amendment: United States v. Verdugo.Urquidez, 41




tified under a narrow reading of United States domestic law, its
validity under international law is questionable.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
1. Ker v. Illinois'3
In 1886, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of extra-
territorial abduction for the first time in Ker. Ker, an American
citizen, was convicted of larceny and embezzlement by an Illi-
nois state court.14 He subsequently fled to Lima, Peru and
claimed asylum.' 5 Governor Hamilton of Illinois petitioned the
Secretary of State of the United States for a warrant, pursuant
to an extradition treaty between the United States and Peru,
requesting the extradition'8  of Ker by the Peruvian
government. 17
In accordance with existing practices, the United States
government dispatched Henry G. Julian, a Pinkerton agent,'8
to retrieve Ker from Peru.19 Julian arrived in Peru with the
necessary papers but neither presented them to any officer of
the Peruvian government, nor made a demand on the govern-
ment for the surrender of Ker.20 Instead, Julian "forcibly and
with violence arrested Ker, placed him aboard the United
States vessel Essex... and brought him home to stand trial in
Illinois."2 '
1056 (1990) (Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to a search by American au-
thorities of a Mexican citizen's residence in Mexico).
12 See supra note 3.
13 119 U.S. 436 (1886) [hereinafter Ker].
14 Id at 437.
15 Id. at 438.
16 This note adopts M. CherifBassiouni's definition of extradition as a system
consisting of several processes whereby one sovereign surrenders to another sover-
eign a person sought after as an accused criminal or fugitive offender. M. CHERw
BAssioum, INTERNATIONAL ExrRAD rnoN AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDEa 1 (1974).
17 Ker, supra note 13, at 438.
18 A Pinkerton agent is similar to a present-day United States Marshall, how-
ever, he worked for a private agency often hired by the United States to retrieve
prisoners from extraditing countries. See generally JAMEs D. HoRoN, THE
PINKERTONS: THE DETErrIvE DYNASTY THAT MADE HISToRy (1967).
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Ker objected to the court's jurisdiction contending that the
arrest was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of
the United States-Peruvian extradition treaty.22 The Court re-
jected Ker's claims, stating:
Julian... did not act nor profess to act under the treaty .... [I]t
was not called into operation, was not relied upon, was not made
the pretext of the arrest, and the facts show it was a clear case of
kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretense of
authority under the treaty or from the government of the United
States. 23
Therefore, the Court held that Ker failed to establish the exist-
ence of any such rights conferred upon him by the treaty.24
Furthermore, the Court rejected Ker's due process claim 25 on
the grounds that the clause dealt exclusively with an individ-
ual's right to a fair trial.26 The Court concluded that the actions
of the arresting officers did not fall within the scope of the Due
Process Clause.27 Hence, Ker established the principle in
United States law that an illegal arrest does not preclude the
court from exercising jurisdiction.
2. Frisbie v. Collins 2s
Unlike Ker, Frisbie did not involve international law.
Rather, it involved a purely domestic issue. In Frisbie, the de-
fendant, Collins, sought release from a Michigan state prison
22 Id. at 439.
2 l& at 443.
24 Id.
25 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant
part: "[n]o state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of the law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
26 Ker, supra note 14, at 440.
27 The Court, in rejecting the due process claim, stated:
The "due process of law" here guaranteed is complied with when the
party is regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the state court, has a
trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and when,
in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to which he is law-
fully entitled.... [Flor mere irregularities in the manner in which he may
be brought into custody of the law, we do not think he is entitled to say that
he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged in a
regular indictment.
Ker, supra note 13, at 440.




where he was serving a life sentence for murder.29 Collins filed
a habeas corpus petition alleging that while living in Chicago,
Michigan police officers "forcibly seized, handcuffed,
blackjacked, and took him to Michigan."30 Collins protested his
conviction, arguing that the means by which he was appre-
hended violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.31
The United States Supreme Court rejected Collins' claim.
Justice Hugo Black, speaking for the majority, reaffirmed the
holding in Ker:
This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v.
Illinois, that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not
impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's
jurisdiction by reason of a "forcible abduction." No persuasive
reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases.
They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied
when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been
fairly apprised of the charges against him and after a fair trial in
accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards.32
The principle established in Ker, and reaffirmed in Frisbie
has become a judicially sanctioned doctrine.3 3 It stands for the
principle that a court's power to exercise personal jurisdiction
over an individual is not impaired by the illegality of the means
by which he is apprehended. The doctrine is used to support
almost every case of illegal abduction, and is consistently
upheld.3 4
29 Id. at 520.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 522.
33 For a further discussion of the doctrine see Andrew B. Campbell, The Ker-
Frisbie Doctrine: A Jurisdictional Weapon in the War on Drugs, 23 VA-D. J. TRms-
NAiL L. 385 (1990); H. Moss Crystle, When Rights Fall in a Forest.. .The Ker.
Frisbie Doctrine and American Judicial Countenance of Extraterritorial Abduc-
tions and Torture, 9 Dic- J. INL L. 387 (1991); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law
Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law Continued, 84 AM.
J. INT?'L L. 444 (1990).
34 See generally, New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (defendant is not
immune from prosecution because his person is not considered a fruit of a forbid-
den search); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (body or identity of a
defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppress-
ible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980)
(respondent is not himself a suppressible fruit and the illegality of his detention
1994] 225
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3. United States v. Toscanino:3 5 The Narrow Exception
In Toscanino, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit established the "Shock-the-Conscience" excep-
tion to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. In Toscanino, the defendant,
an Italian citizen, was charged with conspiracy to import nar-
cotics into the United States.3 6 At trial, Toscanino protested
the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that he had been
illegally abducted.3 7 Toscanino alleged that he had been lured
from his home in Montevideo, Uruguay by a telephone call from
members of the Uruguayan police force, acting at the direction
of the United States government.38
Toscanino and his wife were lured to a deserted area, where
he was knocked unconscious, bound, blindfolded, and driven at
gunpoint to the Uruguayan-Brazilian border.3 9 Once in Brazil,
Toscanino claimed, that under the United States' guidance 40 he
was incessantly tortured and interrogated for seventeen days.41
Toscanino specifically alleged that:
... [His] captors denied him sleep and all forms of nourishment
for days at a time. Nourishment was provided intravenously in a
manner precisely equal to an amount necessary to keep him alive.
Reminiscent of the horror stories told by military men who re-
turned home from Korea and China, Toscanino was forced to walk
up and down a hallway for seven or eight hours at a time.. When
he could no longer stand he was kicked and beaten but all in a
manner contrived to punish without scarring. When he would not
answer, his fingers were pinched with metal pliers. Alcohol was
flushed into his eyes and nose and other fluids.., were forced up
cannot deprive the Government of the opportunity to prove his guilt); Gersten v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (illegal arrest or detention of an individual does not void
a subsequent conviction).
35 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter Toscanino].




40 Toscanino claimed that throughout the entire investigation, the United
States government and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York prosecuting the case were aware of the interrogation and did in fact receive
reports as to its progress. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 at 270. Furthermore, he
claimed that during the period of torture a member of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, was present one or
more times and participated in the interrogation. Id.
41 Id. at 270.
[Vol. 6:221226
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss1/17
1994] U.S. v. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 227
his anal passage .... [Algents of the United States government
attached electrodes to Toscanino's earlobes, toes and genitals.
Jarring jolts of electricity were shot throughout his body, render-
ing him unconscious for indeterminate periods of time but again
leaving no scars.42
Following the interrogations, Toscanino was drugged and
placed on an airplane bound for the United States. 43 Once in-
side the United States, he was arrested, convicted and sen-
tenced to thirty years imprisonment. 4
In light of these allegations, the Second Circuit refused to
apply the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, and remanded the case to the
district court with instructions that if the allegations proved
true, the court should divest itself of jurisdiction.45 Relying on
the Supreme Court cases Rochin v. People of California46 and
Mapp v. Ohio,47 the Second Circuit reasoned that "due process
requires a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of
a defendant where it has been acquired as a result of the gov-
ernment's deliberate, unnecessary, and unreasonable invasion
of the accused's constitutional rights."48 The court thereby es-
tablished that when a government agent engages in conduct
which "shocks the conscience," the court is divested of
jurisdiction.
In theory, the Toscanino exception appears to be a viable
option to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. However, in reality, the ma-
jority of courts have construed the exception narrowly, leaving
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 268, 270.
45 Id. at 275.
46 Id. at 273. In Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), state
police officers fiustrated a defendant's efforts to swallow two morphine capsules in
his possession by taking the defendant, handcuffed, to a hospital. Id. at 166. At
the hospital, upon the police officers' orders, the doctor forced an emetic solution
through a tube into the defendant's stomach against his will. Id. When the solu-
tion produced vomiting, the capsules were recovered. Id. The Supreme Court held
that the policemen's conduct "shocked the conscience" and thereby overturned the
conviction. Id. at 167.
47 Id. at 273. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the United States Constitution was held to be
inadmissible in state court criminal proceedings.
48 Toscanino, supra note 35.
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it with virtually no force.49 Hence, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine re-
mains virtually unchanged even in the wake of the Toscanino
decision.
B. The Principle of Specialty50
The Principle of Specialty provides that the requesting
state, pursuant to a valid extradition treaty, can only prosecute
a surrendered person for the offense for which he was surren-
dered by the requested state.51 The requested state is thus pre-
cluded from prosecuting any crime not listed in the request.5 2
The Principle of Specialty serves the dual function of protecting
49 See United States ex rel. Lujan, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975) (abduction and
transportation of Argentinean defendant to the United States from Bolivia did not
constitute a violation of due process which would require federal courts to divest
themselves of jurisdiction where defendant makes no claim that he was subjected
to torture or custodial interrogation); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1975) (divesting a court of jurisdiction when plaintiff is unable to prove questiona-
ble activities of the government would serve no purpose because the exclusionary
rule would not be effective in deterring unlawful conduct of a foreign government).
50 The Doctrine of Specialty is codified in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477 (1987). It states:
Under most international agreements, state laws, and state practice:
(1) A person who has been extradited to another state will not, unless
the requested state consents,
(a) be tried by the requesting state for an offense other than one for
which he was extradited; or
(b) be given punishment more severe than was provided by the applica-
ble law of the requesting state at the time of the request for extradition.
(2) A person who has been extradited to another state for trial and has
been acquitted of the charges for which he was extradited must be given a
reasonable opportunity to depart from that state.
51 See Bassiouni, supra note 16 at 360. Professor Bassiouni offers five factors
as the rationale for the doctrine:
1. The requested state could have refused extradition if it knew that the
relator (extradited person) would be prosecuted or punished for an offense
other than the one for which extradition was granted.
2. The requesting state would not have in personam jurisdiction over the
relator, if not for the requested state's surrender of that person.
3. The requesting state could not have prosecuted the offender, other than
in absentia, nor could it punish him without securing that person's surren-
der from the requesting state.
4. The requesting state would be abusing a formal process to secure the sur-
render of the person it seeks by relying on the requested state, which will
use its processes to effectuate the surrender.
5. The requested state would be using its processes in reliance upon the
representations made by the requesting state.
(emphasis in original)




fugitives' rights and protecting the extraditing nation from an
abuse of its discretion.53
The Supreme Court first addressed the Principle of Spe-
cialty in United States v. Rauscher."4 In Rauscher, William
Rauscher, a second mate on an American vessel, murdered a
crew member.55 He subsequently fled to Great Britain and
claimed asylum.56 In response to United States' demands,
Great Britain extradited Rauscher to the United States for the
charge of murder.5 7 Rauscher was tried and convicted for in-
flicting cruel and unusual punishment.58
Rauscher appealed on the ground that his conviction for
cruel and unusual punishment violated the United States-
Great Britain Extradition Treaty since he was extradited to
stand trial for the charge of murder only.59 The Supreme Court
overturned the conviction, holding that Rauscher was exempt
from trial for any offense other than those listed in the extradi-
tion papers, until he had the opportunity to return to the coun-
try from which he was taken.60 The Court reasoned that "a
63 Id.




58 Id. at 409.
69 See generally Rauscher, supra note 55, at 409-410 (certifying questions on
appeal).
60 The Court set forth four parts to its holding:
1. That a treaty to which the United States is a party is a law of the
land, of which all courts, state and national, are to take judicial notice, an,&
by the provisions of which they are to be governed, so far as they are capable
of judicial enforcement.
2. That, on a sound construction of the treaty under which the defend-
ant was delivered to this country, and under the proceedings by which this
was done, and acts of Congress that subject, Rsv. STAT. §§ 5272, 5275, he
cannot lawfully be tried for any other offence than murder.
3. The treaty, the acts of Congress, and the proceedings by which he
was extradited, clothe him with the right to exemption from trial for any
other offence, until he has had an opportunity to return to the country from
which he was taken for the purpose alone of trial for the offense specified in
the demand for his surrender. The national honor also requires that good
faith shall be kept with the country which surrendered him.
4. The circumstances that the party was convicted of inflicting cruel
and unusual punishment on the same evidence which was produced before
the committing magistrate in England, in the extradition proceedings for
murder, does not change the principle.
Rauscher, supra note 54.
2291994]
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treaty is primarily a compact between nations. It depends for
the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and honor of
the governments which are parties to it. z61 In light of this, the
Court reasoned that the Constitution places a treaty as the law
of the land equal to an act of Congress.6 2 Therefore, the Court
concluded that when the rights of a citizen under a treaty are to
be enforced, the court should look to the treaty for the answer. 3
Building upon this analysis and the nature of extradition
treaties, the Court stated that the Principle of Specialty was im-
plicit in the extradition treaty:
It is... very clear that this treaty did not intend to depart...
from the recognized public law which has prevailed in the absence
of treaties, and that it was not intended that this treaty should be
used for any other purpose than to secure the trial of the person
extradited for one of the offenses enumerated in the treaty. This is
not only apparent from the general principle that the specific
enumeration of certain matters and things implies the exclusion
of all other, but the entire face of the treaty, including the process
by which it is carried into effect, confirms this view of the
subject.64
Therefore, the Court held that prosecuting Rauscher in viola-
tion of the Principle of Specialty suggested an implication of
fraud upon the rights of the party extradited, and of bad faith to
the country which permitted his extradition.65 The Court re-
solved the issue by divesting the lower court of personal juris-
diction to try Rauscher for the charge of cruel and unusual
punishment. 66
The Principle of Specialty, like the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,
has become judicially sanctioned. However, unlike the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine the Principle of Specialty has not met wide-
spread opposition. The doctrine is widely applied and consist-
ently upheld.67
61 Id. at 417.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 420.
65 Id, at 422.
66 Id. at 433.
67 See United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1990) (Hong Kong
Courts decided defendant could be extradited on charge even though it was not




C. Customary International Law
"Customary international law results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation."68 To be accepted as a custom of international
law a practice must generally satisfy five elements:
[1] concordant practice by a number of states with reference to a
type of situation falling within the domain of international rela-
tions; [21 continuation or repetition of the practice over a consider-
able period of time; [3] conception that the practice is required by,
or consistent with prevailing international law; [4] general acqui-
escence in the practice by other states; [5] the establishment of
'the presence of each of these elements.., by a competent inter-
national authority.'69
Once it is established that a practice satisfies these elements, it
must then be shown that a "state alleged to be bound has ac-
cepted or acquiesced in the custom as a matter of legal obliga-
tion, 'not merely for reasons of political expediency.'" 7o
not violated by trying defendant on both fraud and misuse charges even though
Britain analogized the latter to fraud); United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371 (8th
Cir. 1983) (Costa Rica intended to extradite accused for substantive offenses and
conspiracy, even though conspiracy was omitted from the charges).
68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN4 RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987). See also J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
39-40 (1977). Starke describes the general approach of the International Court of
Justice to the question of the judicial recognition of customary rules as exemplified
in its manual of 1976 as follows:
The Court's decisions show that a State which relies on an alleged inter-
national custom practiced by States must, generally speaking, demonstrate
to the Court's satisfaction that this custom has become so established as to
be binding on the other party. This attitude of judicial caution... is con-
firmed by the experience of the International Law Commission and of inter-
national legal conferences and is consistent with another trend in the
Court's decisions viz., that the autonomy or sovereignty of a State should be
respected unless the Court is duly satisfied that such autonomy or sover-
eignty is limited by rules that are binding on the State.
Id. at 47.
69 ANTHONY A. D'Awm'To, THE CONcrPT or CuSTot IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 7
(1971).
70 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIMD STATES
§ 102 cint. e (1987) (quoting Columbia v. Peru, I.C.J. Rep. 266, 267 (1950)),
19941
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Customary international law has long been accepted as a
component of United States federal common law. In the prece-
dent case, The Paquete Habana,71 Justice Gray stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction,
as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there
is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judi-
cial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civi-
lized nations .... 72
The Paquete Habana has come to stand for the proposition that
United States courts are obligated to enforce customary inter-
national law as "the law of the land."7 3
D. Treaty Interpretation74
There are few areas of international law as disputed as
treaty interpretation. In 1969, The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties attempted to codify the rules of treaty interpre-
tation. 75 The Convention described the rule of treaty interpre-
tation, stating "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and pur-
pose."7 6 Thus, under the Convention, interpretation begins by
71 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (Supreme Court relied on international custom as a
guide to understanding law of nations in order to determine the existence of a valid
customary rule giving immunity to small fishing vessels from belligerent action in
time of war).
72 Id at 700.
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 cmt. d (1987) (customary international law while not mentioned explicitly in
the Supremacy Clause, is also federal law and as such is supreme over state law).
74 The interpretation of international agreements is codified in RESTATEMENT
(TmRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UN=IE STATES § 325. It states:
1. An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in ac-
cordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context
and in light of its object and purpose.
2. Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the agreement, and subsequent practice between the parties in
the application of the agreement, are to be taken in account in its
interpretation.
75 See T.O. ELuAS, Tim MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 5 (1974).
76 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted, May 22, 1969, art. 31,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 LL.M. 679 (1969).
232 [Vol. 6:221
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examining the meaning of the text, rather than inquiring into
the intention of the parties.77 The Convention principles and
related modem case law set out the foundation for understand-
ing treaty interpretation.78
E. The United States-Mexico Treaty on Extradition79
The United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty was con-
cluded on May 4, 1978.80 The purpose and object of the treaty
was to provide the legal framework, whereby one of the parties
could request from the other the extradition of persons from its
77 Contra LoRD McNAR, THE LAW oF TREATis 365 (1961) (goal of treaty in-
terpretation is to give effect to the expressed intention of the parties as expressed
in the words used by them in light of the surrounding circumstances).
78 The general rules of treaty interpretation are:
1. Good Faith: The principle of good faith is the most fundamental prin-
ciple of treaty interpretation. It requires that every treaty must be carried
out in good faith by the parties. Sm IAw SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENISON
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 119 (1973).
2. Plain Meaning: This principle interprets the words of the treaty so as
to give effect to their ordinary or general meaning. LoRD McNAIR, THE LAw
OF TREATIES 366 (1961). See also Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985)
[hereinafter Air France] (in construing a treaty a court should give the spe-
cific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations
of the contracting parties).
3. Special Meaning: "A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is
established that the parties intended so." SncLAm, at 126.
4. Context: Context means the treaty's preamble, other clauses, an-
nexes, and other writings within the four comers of the treaty. Id. at 127.
See also Air France supra 9 2 of this note (Starting point for analysis is the
text of the treaty and the context in which the words are used); Choctaw
Nations of Indians v. U.S., 318 U.S. 423 (1943) (treaty's history, the negotia-
tions, and the practical construction adopted by the parties may also be
relevant).
5. Liberal Construction: In choosing between conflicting interpretation
of a treaty obligation, a narrow and restrictive interpretation is to be
avoided as not consonant with the principles deemed controlling in the in-
terpretation of the international agreement. [11f a treaty fairly admits of
two constructions, one restricting the right which may be claimed under it,
and the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred.
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933).
6. International Law: Interpretation should take into account any rele-
vant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the par-
ties. SiNcLAm, at 138.
79 Treaty on Extradition, May 4, 1978, United States-Mexico, 31 U.S.T. 5059,
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territory.8 ' The treaty contains "twenty-three articles and an
appendix listing the extraditable offenses."8 2 Justice Stevens
describes the treaty as:
From the preamble, through the description of the parties' obliga-
tions with respect to offenses committed within as well as beyond
the territory of a requesting party, the delineation of the proce-
dures and evidentiary requirements for extradition, the special
provisions for political offenses and capital punishment, and other
details, the Treaty appears to have been designed to cover the en-
tire subject of extradition.83
Justice Stevens further describes the scope of the treaty's
application8 4 as reaching those offenses, specified in article 2,8 5
81 Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirm-
ance at 6, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712).
To support this contention Amicus refers to the record at 68-69.
82 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2198.
83 Id.
84 Article 22 entitled "Scope of Application" states:
1. This Treaty shall apply to offenses specified in Article 2 committed before
and after this treaty enters into force.
2. Requests for extradition that are under process on the date of the entry into
force of this Treaty, shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions of the
Treaty of 22 February, 1899, and the Additional Conventions on Extradition of 25
June 1902, 23 December 1925, and 16 August 1939. Treaty on Extradition, supra
note 79, at art. 22.
85 Article 2 states:
1. Extradition shall take place, subject to this Treaty, for wilful acts which fall
within any of the clauses of the Appendix and are punishable in accordance with
the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty the maximum of
which shall not be less than one year.
2. If extradition is requested for the execution of a sentence, there shall be the
additional requirement that the part of the sentence remaining to be served shall
not be less than six months.
3. Extradition shall also be granted for wilful acts which, although not being
included in the Appendix, are punishable, in accordance with the federal laws of
both Contracting Parties, by a deprivation of liberty the maximum of which shall
not be less than one year.
4. Subject to the conditions established in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, extradition
shall also be granted:
a. For the attempt to commit an offense; conspiracy to commit an of-
fense; or the participation in the execution of an offense; or
b. When, for the purpose of granting jurisdiction to the United States
government, transportation of persons or property, the use of the mail or
other means of carrying out interstate or foreign commerce, is also an ele-
ment of the offense.




committed before and after the treaty became enforceable.8 6
At issue in Alvarez is Article 9 of the treaty,8 7 which ad-
dresses the extradition of nationals.88 It grants the executive of
the requested party the discretion to surrender that party's own
nationals. If extradition is not granted the requested party
must submit the case to its own tribunals for resolution.8 9
III. CASE HISTORY
A. Alvarez's Abduction
On April 2, 1990, Alvarez was abducted from his medical
office in Guadalajara, Mexico. 90 He was flown in a rented twin-
engine plane to Texas and arrested for the kidnapping and mur-
der of DEA Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar ("Camarena"),
and Alfredo Zavala-Avelar, a Mexican pilot who had assisted
Camarena in his investigation of drug plantations. 9' The kid-
86 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2198.
87 Article 9 of the treaty provides:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own na-
tionals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not pre-
vented by the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its
discretion, it deemed proper to do so.
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article,
the requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the
offense.
Treaty on Extradition, supra note 79, at art. 9.
88 Mexican domestic law prohibits the extradition of its nationals. Brief for
the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 11, Alva-
rez, supra note 3, at 2188 (No. 91-712).
89 See Treaty on Extradition, supra note 79.
90 United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 603 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
9' On February 7, 1985, Drug Enforcement Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar
"was kidnapped outside the American Consulate in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico."
Id. at 601-2. One month later, Agent Camarena's mutilated body was found at a
ranch about sixty miles outside of Guadalajara, "along with Alfredo Zavala-Avelar,
a Mexican pilot who had assisted Camarena" in his investigations. Id. at 602
(describing the events of the abduction of Alvarez-Machain); see also DEA Payment
Plan for Doctor Detailed; Camarena Case: Witness Says He Paid Friends $20,000
Plus $6,000 A Week to Deliver the Suspect to the U.S. The DEA Insists It Was Not
A Reward or Bounty, L.A. Tibms, (Southland Edition), May 26, 1990, at 26.
The abduction occurred as a result of the failure of negotiations between the
United States and Mexico in which Mexico would trade Alvarez for Isaac Naredo
Moreno, who was residing in the United States and wanted by Mexico in connec-
tion with the theft of large sums of money from politicians in Mexico. See Caro-
Quintero, supra note 90, at 602.
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napping was engineered by Antonio Garate Bustamante
("Garate"), a former Mexican police officer and DEA inform-
ant.92 Garate, under the direction of Hector Berrellez, head of
the Los Angeles DEA unit investigating Camarena's death,93
organized and arranged for his associates in Mexico 9 4 to abduct
Alvarez and bring him to the United States.95 In return, the
abductors were paid fifty thousand dollars plus expenses.96
At 7:45 p.m., on April 2, 1990, five or six armed men bear-
ing Mexican federal police badges forcibly entered Alvarez's
medical office. 97 The men placed a gun to Alvarez's head and
warned him that if he did not cooperate he would be shot.98
Alvarez was then taken to a house in Guadalajara. 99 Once
inside the house, Alvarez claimed he was punched, injected
with a substance that made him feel "light-headed and dizzy",
and shocked six or seven times through the soles of his shoes
with "an electric shock apparatus." 100
Shortly thereafter, Alvarez was transported to Leon, Mex-
ico and put aboard a twin engine plane.' 0 ' On April 3, 1990, he
92 Caro-Quintero, supra note 90, at 602 (describing the role Garate played in
the abduction); see also Henry Weinstein, Witness Tells of Kidnapping Payout;
Camarena Trial: DRA Operative Says $60,000 Has Been Paid. No Ruling On Le-
gality of Abduction of Mexican Doctor, L.A. Tnms, (Home Edition), May 26, 1990,
at 26.
93 At trial, Berrellez stated that he received authorization for the plan from
Peter Gruden, Deputy Director of the Drug Enforcement Agency. See Drug Agency
Paid $20,000 to Bring Doctor to U.S., Cm. Tam., (Chicagoland North Edition), May
26, 1990, at 3 (describing the role Gruben played in the abduction).
94 According to Garate at trial, his associates included former military police,
Mexican Federal Judicial Police and various citizens. Caro-Quintero, supra note
90, at 602; see also Jay Mathews, Agent: DEA Put Up $50,000 For Kidnapping of
Doctor; Court Told Washington Authorized Operation, WASH. PosT, May 26, 1990,
at A2 (describing Garate's friends hired to carry out the abduction).
95 Caro-Quintero, supra note 90, at 602.
96 Id. at 603. As of May 25, the DEA had made a partial payment of $20,000
to the abductors. Id. In addition, the DEA evacuated seven of the abductors and
their families from Mexico to the United States. Id. The DEA continues to pay the
expenses of the abductors in the estimated amount of $6,000. Id. at 604. There
was testimony at trial that those families that were not evacuated were arrested
by Mexican Federal Judicial Police. Id.
97 Id. at 603.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Although making these claims at trial, upon arrival in El Paso on April 3,
1990, Alvarez was asked whether he had been mistreated, tortured, or abused and





arrived in El Paso where he was met and arrested by DEA
agents.1 0 2 Shortly after arrival, Alvarez complained of pains in
his chest.'0 3 He was taken to Thomason General Hospital in El
Paso, where he was thoroughly examined.10 4 The doctors found
no signs of mistreatment. 0 5 In response to the abduction Mex-
ico protested and demanded Alvarez's repatriation. 0 6
B. The District Court's Holding °7
Judge Rafeedie of the Central District Court of California,
faced with a variety of contradictory facts, 0 8 multiple indict-
ments, 0 9 and a case of state-sponsored abduction, held that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction to try Alvarez." 0 Alvarez
raised three arguments to support his claim that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over him. First, Alvarez argued
that his abduction denied him due process of law as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 1 The court, however, rejected
the claim, reasoning that under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine the
forcible abduction of a defendant from another jurisdiction does






106 Id. at 604. On May 16, 1990, the Embassy of Mexico presented a diplomatic
note to the United States State Department. Id. The note stated that the govern-
ment of Mexico considered that the kidnapping of Alvarez and his transfer to the
United States were carried out by agents of the United States and in violation of
the Extradition Treaty. Id. Mexico further demanded the return of Machain. Id.
107 The district court's opinion involving Alvarez-Machain is entitled United
States v. Caro-Quintero. Id. at 599.
108 For example, at the pre-trial hearing the United States had denied that it
participated in the abduction, but even if it did, the United States protested that
the claim would be barred by the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. Id. at 601.
109 The sixth superseding indictment charged Alvarez with conspiracy to com-
mit violent acts and violent acts in furtherance of an enterprise engaged in racke-
teering activity (18 U.S.C. § 1959), conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent (18 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (c)), kidnap of a federal agent (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5)), felony murder (18
U.S.C. §§ 1111(a), 1114), and accessory after the fact (18 U.S.C. § 3). Alvarez-
Machain, supra note 1, at 2190, n. 1.
110 Caro-Quintero, supra note 90, at 599.
"Il Id. at 604.
112 Caro-Quintero, supra note 90, at 604.
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The court further rejected Alvarez's second argument that
the circumstances surrounding his abduction fit within the
"shock-the-conscience" exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. 13
The court reasoned that when a defendant establishes that the
government's conduct was "of the most shocking and outrageous
kind," the court is divested of jurisdiction." 4 However, the
court concluded, that even if Alvarez's allegations of mistreat-
ment in the course of the abduction were true, they did not war-
rant dismissal under the Toscanino exception. 115
The court, however, found merit in Alvarez's third argu-
ment that his abduction violated the United States-Mexico Ex-
tradition Treaty. The court determined the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine had no application to violations of federal treaty law." 6
As such, the court held that the unilateral abduction of Alvarez,
by paid agents of the United States, combined with the official
protest of the Mexican government, constituted a violation of
the Extradition Treaty between the two sovereigns." 7 The
court found it axiomatic that a party to an extradition treaty
violates its contracting partner's sovereignty when it unilater-
ally abducts a person from the territory of the contracting part-
ner." 8 Accordingly, the case was dismissed." 9
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding ordering the
repatriation of Alvarez to Mexico.' 20 The court based its deci-
sion on its ruling in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,'2'




116 Id. at 605.
117 Id. at 609.
118 Id. at 610.
119 Id. at 615.
120 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991).
121 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Verdugo-Urquidez]. In Verdugo-
Urquidez, Rene Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen of Mexico, was suspected of being a
leader of the drug cartel which murdered Drug Enforcement Agent Camarena. Id.
at 1343. He was abducted by several individuals and brought to the United States
to stand trial for the murder of Camarena. Id. The trial court found Verdugo-
Urquidez guilty of the murder of Camarena. Id. On appeal, Verdugo-Urquidez's
conviction was overturned on the grounds that the United States lacked jurisdic-
tion to try the defendant because his abduction violated the United States-Mexico




where it held that the forcible abduction of a Mexican national
without the consent of Mexico violated the United States-Mex-
ico Extradition Treaty.122 The court, relying on Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, placed emphasis on Mexico's objection to the abduction
and the United States' failure to contradict the claim that the
DEA sponsored the abduction.123 Thus, the court determined it
was not necessary to remand the case for further factual find-
ings. 124 Therefore, the court concluded that the holding in
Verdugo-Urquidez required the dismissal of the charges against
Alvarez. 125 The United States appealed this decision to the
United States Supreme Court and certiorari was granted. 126
C. The Supreme Court's Holding
1. Majority Opinion
On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the issue of
whether the district court had jurisdiction to try Alvarez. 127 Al-
varez claimed that his forcible abduction violated the treaty and
precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction over him. 28
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, rejected this argu-
ment and held that the district court had jurisdiction to try Al-
varez for the murder of Camarena.'2 9
The Court first examined whether the Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine'30 was applicable to the case.' 3 ' Under the Principle of
Specialty established in Rauscher,132 the Court stated that a
defendant may not be prosecuted in violation of the terms of an
extradition treaty.133 However, the Court reasoned when a
treaty has not been invoked, a court may, under Ker, exercise
jurisdiction even though the defendant's presence was procured
of Mexico to the abduction and the United States' participation in the kidnapping.
Id. at 1343, 1359.
122 Id. at 1341.
123 Alvarez, supra note 3 at 1466.
124 Id. at 1467.
125 Id.
126 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 857 (1992).
127 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2190.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 For discussion see supra note 14, and accompanying text.
131 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2193.
132 For discussion see supra note 55, and accompanying text.
133 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2191.
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by force.134 Thus, the Court concluded that if the treaty did not
prohibit the abduction, the rule of Ker applied and jurisdiction
was proper.' 3 5 As such, the Court concentrated its analysis on
whether the terms of the treaty prohibited the abduction. i36
After examining the terms of the treaty, the Court deter-
mined that although detailed, the treaty did not contain any
provisions which explicitly prohibited the abduction, nor did the
treaty constitute the exclusive means of obtaining jurisdiction
over the defendant. 13 7 Furthermore, the Court noted that the
history of negotiations and practice under the treaty failed to
show that abduction outside the treaty violated its terms. 38
Thus, the Court concluded that the language of the treaty, in
the context of its history, did not prohibit the abduction.139
The Court then addressed Alvarez's argument that the
treaty should be interpreted against general principles of inter-
national law, which he contended, prohibited the abduction. 140
The Court rejected Alvarez's argument.14 1 It reasoned that
general principles of international law did not provide a basis
for interpreting the treaty to include an implied term prohibit-
ing international abductions.142 The Court explained that
drawing such an inference from the treaty would go beyond es-
tablished precedent and practice. 43 The Court contrasted Al-
varez's case with Rauscher, explaining that in Rauscher it
implied a term into the United States-Great Britain Extradition
Treaty because of the practice of nations with regard to extradi-
tion treaties. 44 However, the Court concluded, to imply a term
into the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, based on the
practice of nations with regards to international law more gen-
134 Id. at 2192.
135 Id. at 2193.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 2193-94.
138 Id. at 2194.
139 The Court noted that the Mexican Government knew of the existence of the
Ker doctrine as early as 1906, and the United States' position that it applied to
forcible abductions made outside the terms of the United States-Mexico Extradi-
tion Treaty. Id. at 2194-95.
140 Id. at 2195.
141 Id. at 2196.
142 Id.
143 Id.




erally, would require a much larger inferential leap with only
the most general international law principles to support it.
14
Therefore, the Court determined that while the abduction may
have violated general principles of international law, the deci-
sion to return Alvarez to Mexico was a matter outside the
treaty, for the Executive Branch to decide. 46
In light of these findings, the Court determined that
neither the explicit terms of the Extradition Treaty, nor gen-
eral principles of international law, barred the abduction as a
means of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant. 147 There-
fore, the Court concluded that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine applied
to the case, and it would not examine the means by which Alva-
rez came before it.148 Thus, the Court held Alvarez's forcible
abduction did not prohibit his trial in the United States for the
murder of Camarena. 149
2. Minority/Dissent50
Justice Stevens, speaking for the minority, argued that the
Court's holding transformed the provisions of the treaty "into
little more than verbiage."' 51 The minority reasoned that the
document only made sense if understood as requiring each sig-
natory to comply with the provisions whenever it wished to ob-
tain jurisdiction over an individual located in the other
signatory's country.152 Stevens stated, under the majority's
reasoning, the United States could execute someone instead of
extraditing him since it was not expressly forbidden in the
treaty.153 In Steven's opinion the "manifest scope and object of
the treaty plainly... [implied] a mutual undertaking to respect
the territorial integrity of the other contracting party."
154
Similarly, Stevens rejected the Court's holding that Rau-
scher 55 did not provide a basis for implying a term into the
146 Id. at 2196.
146 Id. at 2196-97.
141 Id. at 2197.
148 Id,
149 Id.
160 Justice Blackmun, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Stevens dissented.
16t Alvarez, supra note 3, at 219B.
152 Id. at 2199.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 For discussion see supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
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treaty forbidding abduction as a basis for obtaining jurisdic-
tion.156 Stevens argued that although the Court's decision in
Rauscher was supported by a number of judicial holdings, those
cases were not as uniformly accepted as the international prin-
ciple prohibiting one nation from violating the sovereignty of
another.157 Therefore, Stevens found it shocking that a party
to an extradition treaty could have secretly reserved the right to
make seizures of citizens in the other's territory.15 8 Thus, Ste-
vens concluded that Rauscher dictated the existence of an im-
plied term in the treaty prohibiting the forcible abduction of
Alvarez. 159
Furthermore, Stevens rejected the majority's claim that
Ker was applicable to the case.' 60 Steven's emphasized that,
unlike Alvarez, Ker dealt with the actions of a private citizen
acting on his own.' 61 The majority's failure to reconcile this
was a critical flaw in the decision. 62 Stevens concluded that
the majority's misplaced reliance on Ker, combined with its fail-
ure to read into the treaty an implied term prohibiting abduc-
tion, led to the majority's blatant disregard for customary
international law principles.' 63
IV. ANALYsIs
The Supreme Court's decision to uphold the district court's
jurisdiction over Alvarez may be justified under a narrow read-
ing of Ker. However, the majority's holding is in essence a re-
sult of a misapplication of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, a
misinterpretation of the United States-Mexico Extradition
Treaty, and a disregard for international law principles.
The majority's decision fails to differentiate between pri-
vate kidnapping and state-sponsored abduction and is based on
a gross overstatement of the rule of Ker.'64 In support of its
position, the majority offered the broad proposition that the
156 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2201.
157 I&
158 Id. at 2201.
159 Id. at 2202.
160 Id. at 2203.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 2205.




power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by
the fact that jurisdiction has been obtained by a forcible abduc-
tion.165 Although the majority correctly stated the rule of Ker,
its reliance on that case to justify the exercise of jurisdiction
over Alvarez is misplaced. There are two major reasons why
the majority's reading of Ker should not govern this case.
First, Ker was abducted by a private individual without
any authorization from the United States Government. The
Ker Court held "that the extradition treaty was not called into
effect... and the facts showed that it was a clear case of kid-
napping without any authority from the United States."166
Therefore, Ker stands for the limited proposition that a private
kidnapping, without any pretense of authority under the treaty
or from the government, does not violate the terms of an extra-
dition treaty.167 This however, lends no support for the major-
ity's determination that the district court had jurisdiction over
Alvarez. Here, the abduction of Alvarez was sponsored, fi-
nanced and carried out by agents of the United States, a situa-
tion completely different from the factual setting of Ker. Thus,
Ker does not address state-sponsored abduction in violation of a
treaty. As such, it is inapplicable to Alvarez.
Second, even if it is conceded that Ker permits state- spon-
sored abduction, it would still not control this case. In Ker, the
Peruvian Government at no time protested the abduction of
Ker. In fact, it was in doubt whether the treaty between the
United States and Peru was even in effect at the time of Ker's
abduction. The failure of the majority to understand the signifi-
cance of Peru's lack of objection to Ker's abduction has led to the
majority's misguided attempt to apply the rule of Ker to Alva-
rez.'6 8 There have been no cases where Ker has been upheld
when the violated country objected to the abduction.169 The
165 Id. at 2192.
166 Ker, supra note 13, at 443.
167 Verdugo-Urquidez, supra note 121, at 1345.
168 It is significant that Peru did not object because under international law,
without the consent or acquiescence by the territorial state, another state may not
send its agents into that state's territory to apprehend persons accused of crimes.
RESTATEMENT (THrD) FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TnE UNITED STATES § 432 cmt.
c (1987) (if the unauthorized action involves abduction, the state from which the
person was abducted may demand return of the person, and international law re-
quires he be returned).
169 Verdugo-Urquidez, supra note 121, at 1347.
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majority fails to acknowledge this and tries to apply a doctrine
that is inapplicable when the aggrieved state protests. In fact,
most cases that have dealt with similar issues take the position
that if the country protests, the court may be divested of juris-
diction.170 Therefore, Ker has no bearing on Alvarez's case.
,Another failure of the Court's holding is its reliance upon
Frisbie to justify its refusal to divest the district court of juris-
diction over Alvarez. Frisbie was a domestic case of interstate
abduction, where neither a treaty nor international law was in-
volved. Frisbie involved the abduction by Michigan police of a
suspected criminal located in Ilhinois. 171 Furthermore, Frisbie's
objection was based on the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, not on a violation of a treaty.172 Clearly,
Frisbie has no bearing on international abductions involving ex-
tradition treaties which spell out the procedures for gaining ju-
risdiction. Therefore, the majority's theory that jurisdiction can
be grounded in the long established Ker-Frisbie doctrine is
absurd.
The majority's reasoning is further weakened by its failure
to interpret the treaty consistently with general principles of
treaty interpretation. 173 It is true, as the majority points out,
that no provision in the treaty specifically prohibits abduction
as a means of acquiring jurisdiction over Alvarez. 7 4 However,
when examined as a whole, the scope of the treaty and inten-
tions of the parties in drafting the treaty show the fallacy of the
majority's conclusion. 175 The majority ignores two basic rules of
170 See, e.g. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S.CL. 209 (1990) (without a protest from Honduras, Matta's claims that inter-
national law was violated, do not entitle him to relief); United States v. Reed, 639
F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981) (Bahamian government made no protest); United States v.
Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981) (Panamanian and Venezuelan authorities did
not object to the trial).
171 Frisbie, supra note 28, at 520.
172 Id,
173 For discussion see supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
174 Alvarez-Machain, supra note 3, at 2195.
175 In the dissent, Justice Stevens stated: "[The] manifest scope and object of
the treaty itself plainly imply a mutual undertaking to respect the territorial in-
tegrity of the other contracting party." Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2199. Further-
more, the court in Verdugo-trquidez stated that all these provisions "only make
sense if they are understood as requiring each signatory to comply with those pro-
cedures whenever it wishes to obtain jurisdiction over an individual who is located




interpretation: treaties are to be interpreted in the context in
which the written words are used;1 76 and treaties are to be con-
strued as requiring the parties to carry out the provisions in
good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning in light of
the treaty's object and purpose.1 77
As stated above, in interpreting a treaty the starting point
is "the text of the treaty and context in which the words are
used."178 The majority claims to have followed this procedure
and has not found a specific provision prohibiting the abduc-
tion.179 However, the majority's reading is narrow and frag-
mented. It fails to examine the provisions of the treaty in the
setting of the whole treaty.
As Justice Stevens points out in his dissent, the Extradition
Treaty is a comprehensive document which establishes the
procedures by which one country gains custody of a criminal
suspect from another country.'3 0 The document lists in consid-
erable detail the extraditable offenses,' 8 ' the process for extra-
dition, 8 2  and the procedures for political offenses. 183
Furthermore, as both the majority and minority note, Article 9
expressly provides that neither contracting party is bound to
deliver its own nationals, although it may do so at its own dis-
176 See Air France v. Saks, supra note 78 at 397 (citing Maximov v. United
States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963)).
177 Article 31(1Xc) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: "A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its objects and
purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 76.
178 Air France, supra note 78, at 397.
179 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2193.
180 Id. at 2198.
181 Treaty of Extradition, supra, note 79, at art. 2. Article 2, which refers to the
Appendix containing twenty-eight separate extraditable offenses and all willful
acts punishable under the federal law of both states by a deprivation of liberty for
more than one year.
182 Article 1(2) states:
For an offense committed outside the territory of the requesting party, the
requesting party shall grant extradition if-
a. its laws would provide for the punishment of such an offense commit-
ted in similar circumstances, or
b. the person sought is a national of the requesting party, and that
party has jurisdiction under its own laws to try that person.
Id.
183 Article 5(1) states: Extradition shall not be granted when the offense for
which it is requested is political...." Id.
1994]
25
PACE INT'L L. REV.
cretion.1 8 4 It is difficult to believe that in light of the detailed
provisions of the treaty, the United States and Mexico did not
consider the treaty the exclusive means of jurisdiction. How-
ever, this is exactly what the majority concluded.
A further analysis of the context of the treaty shows the
absurdity of the majority's conclusion. The majority failed to
read the treaty as a whole, but instead, concentrated solely on
each individual article. If it is true, as the majority stated, that
the treaty is not the exclusive means of obtaining jurisdiction,
then the provisions dealing with the limitation of nationals and
the mandatory language, are worthless.
In order to gain a better perspective on the context of the
treaty, the preamble states that the purpose of the treaty is to
cooperate and foster mutual assistance.185 In light of this
stated goal, it is difficult to imagine that despite the more than
eighty separate provisions of the treaty, the two countries
viewed it as nothing more than an optional means of acquiring
jurisdiction when it suited their needs. In effect the majority's
failure to read the treaty as a whole has turned the provisions
into "mere verbiage."186
Furthermore, the majority neglects to read into the treaty
the duty of the parties to carry out the agreement in good faith,
in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms, and in
light of its object and purpose.'8 7 It is difficult to see how the
majority's finding that the unilateral abduction was legal could
facilitate the stated goals of the treaty which are "to cooperate
more closely in the fight against crime, and to this end, to mutu-
ally render better assistance in the matters of extradition."188
Furthermore, on a basic level of general international law, the
majority's conclusion fails to further the goals of extradition
treaties in general. A country's purpose in establishing an ex-
tradition treaty is to acquire a legal basis by which it can de-
mand the return of a fugitive. 189 This furthers international
184 Treaty on Extradition, supra note 87.
185 Treaty on Extradition, supra note 79, at preamble.
185 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2198.
187 Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, supra note 76.
188 Id.
189 See GBnERT, supra note 53, at 33 (mutual legal assistance treaties... can
be seen in broader forms of cooperation when meeting the problem of crimes or




law by establishing a process, whereby the sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of States are protected and impermissible con-
duct is restricted.1 90 The majority's interpretation of the treaty
makes this process meaningless. It ignores the underlying goal
of the treaty which is mutual respect for state sovereignty.
The majority's refusal to recognize Article 9 as the exclu-
sive means of acquiring jurisdiction over a national further ex-
hibits the majority's failure to read into the treaty the duty of
the parties to carry out the treaty in good faith. Article 9 takes
into account Mexican law which prohibits the extradition of na-
tionals. However, the majority's decision makes light of Mex-
ico's domestic legal order by allowing the United States to
violate its agreement. In effect, the majority's holding means
that regardless of the good faith effort of both countries to es-
tablish a system of extradition, either nation is free to violate
the terms of the treaty. This interpretation clearly ignores the
most basic notion that agreements are to be carried out in good
faith.
However, even assuming that the majority correctly inter-
preted the treaty as not constituting the exclusive means of
obtaining jurisdiction, the majority fails to interpret it consist-
ently with principles of international law. Customary interna-
tional law has long recognized that a state must not violate the
territorial sovereignty of another state.'9 1 This theory is rooted
in the principle that the jurisdiction of a state within its own
territory is exclusive and absolute. 92 Thus, while a state may
take certain measures of nonjudicial enforcement against a per-
son in another state, its law enforcement officers cannot arrest
a suspect in another state without that state's permission.
93
190 See BASSiOUNI, supra note 16, at 194 (international law is designed to pro-
tect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States).
191 1 LASSA OPPEN nm, I1NERNATIoNAL LAw 295 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1955).
192 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Jus-
tice Marshall went on to explain:
[Sovereignty] is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any re-
striction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an invest-
ment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could im-
pose such restriction.
Id. at 136.
193 RESTATE ENT (THID) OF FoREiGN RELATiONS LAW OF TE UNTE STATES
§ 432(2) (1987) (state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the
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Therefore "the first and foremost restriction imposed by inter-
national law upon a state is that-failing the existence of a per-
missive rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its power in
any form in the territory of another state." 94
The majority's decision refuses to acknowledge this princi-
ple. Instead the majority reasons that it would require too
much of an inferential leap to imply a term prohibiting abduc-
tion from general principles of international law.195 This hold-
ing directly contradicts the universal view of a state's sovereign
right not to have its territorial integrity compromised by an-
other state. This central principle is embodied in Chapter 17 of
The Charter of the Organization of American States, 96 and Ar-
ticle 2 of the Charter of The United Nations. 197 It has also met
wide acceptance in judicial decisions' 98 and international con-
ventions. 199 Yet, besides this universal view, the majority re-
fuses to interpret the treaty as implicitly prohibiting abduction.
This conclusion is illogical. To infer respect for state sover-
eignty is not a great leap; rather it merely requires the recogni-
territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly
authorized officials of that state). Id.
194 The S.S. Lotus (Turkey v. France), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18
(1927).
195 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2196.
196 Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2416, 2420, T.IAS. No. 2361, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Febru-
ary 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847. Article 17 provides that the "terri-
tory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily ... of...
measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds
whatever." Id.
197 U.N. Charter art. 2, 4. Article 2, Paragraph 4 obligates "all members to
refrain ... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any state .... "
198 See supra notes 200 and 202; see also The Savarkar Arbitration case, where
the Permanent Court of Arbitration held that implicit in its judgment, if the return
of a fugitive would have been by force, then France could have the demanded pris-
oner's return on the grounds that it violated France's sovereignty. Savarkar Case
(Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 275 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1911).
199 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935) (proposed). Article 16
stated:
In exercising jurisdiction under this convention, no state shall prosecute or
punish any person who has been brought within its territory or a place sub-
ject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law
or international convention, without first obtaining the consent of the state




U.S. v. AL VAREZ-MACHAIN
tion that the principle of sovereignty underlies all relations
between states. As such the majority fails to recognize that
treaties are interpreted against a backdrop of international law,
and that international law delineates the circumstances under
which one party will be permitted to rescind the treaty or take
other steps. 20 0 This exhibits the Court's lack of understanding
of international law and a tolerance for the violation of such.
Furthermore, the majority may have violated United
States' domestic law by refusing to apply international law in
reaching its decision. Under The Paquete Habana,20o Ameri-
can courts are obligated to apply customary international law
unless it is abrogated by a treaty, executive order, or legislative
act.20 2 None of these situations exist in this case. Whether or
not the Court's interpretation of the Treaty is correct, the
Treaty by no means expressly authorizes abduction. Likewise,
neither the Senate nor President expressly authorized the ab-
duction. Therefore, the majority's refusal to apply international
law in its decision not only violates international law but also
domestic law.
By failing to affirm the lower courts' holdings that the dis-
trict court did not have jurisdiction over Alvarez, the majority
has sanctioned the practice of extraterritorial abductions. One
can interpret the majority's decision as sanctioning the United
States' methods as a means of getting revenge for the violent
murder of Camarena.20 3 If the majority affirmed the lower
courts' decisions it could have remedied the United States'
egregious actions. Instead the majority chose to endorse the
United States' actions even though they violated the Extradi-
tion Treaty as well as the international principle of State
sovereignty.
200 Carlos M. Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLuM. L. REv. 1082 (1992); James C. Wolf, Comment, The Jurisprudence of
Treaty Interpretation, 21 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1023 (1988).
201 See supra, note 71 and accompanying text.
202 Id. at 700.
203 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2205. Justice Stevens, in his dissent warned
against the Court allowing the executive to use the courts to gain revenge for the
murder of Camarena. Id. He stated: "The desire for revenge exerts [a pressure]...
but it is precisely at such moments that we should remember and be guided by our
duty to 'render judgment evenly and dispassionately according to law'.. . ." (quot-
ing United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 342, 67 S.Ct. 677, 720, 91 L.Ed.
884 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)). Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
"He that would make his own liberty secure must guard
even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he
establishes a precedent that will reach to himself."20 4
In deciding that the abduction of Alvarez was legal, the
Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of extraterritorial abduc-
tions as a means of gaining jurisdiction over an individual. In
doing so, the Court has established a dangerous precedent that
someday may be used against the United States.
In recognizing the potential impact of its decision, Justice
Stevens stated: "[t]he way we perform... in a case of this kind
sets an example that other tribunals in other countries are sure
to emulate."20 5 Although it may not be the Court's role to stop
the practice of extraterritorial abduction, it is critical that the
Court does not contribute to the problem by issuing flawed and
unsound decisions.
As a result of the Alvarez decision, the Court has made a
mockery of Mexico's sovereignty, and nullified the object and
purpose of the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty. Fur-
ther, it has extended the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to justify state-
sponsored abductions. However, given the widespread opposi-
tion to this decision it is unlikely that it will be accepted or
tolerated in the international community. 20 6 It is unfortunate
that the Court did not feel compelled to respect Mexico's pro-
tests. In refusing to do so, it has sanctioned the violation of in-
ternational law and has furthered the practice of
204 Alvarez, supra note 3, at 2206 (quoting THoMAs PArNE, THa COMPL=
WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE, 588).
205 Id. at 2205-6.
206 The international community expressed disdain for the decision. The heads
of the government of the Caribbean Community (Caricom) issued a statement af-
ter their summit in Port of Spain denouncing the decision: "[we] emphatically re-
ject the notion that any state may seek to enforce its domestic law by abduction of
persons from the territory of another ... so as to bring them within its jurisdiction
in order to stand trial." U.S. Wight To Abduct" Rejected By Angry Caricom Lead-
ers, Latin America Regional Reports: Caribbean, July 23, 1992, at 8. On June 16,
Bolivian Foreign Ministry official Armando Loaizo told reporters the decision rep-
resents the United States' imposing force over international law. Reaction To U.S.
Supreme Court Decision Endorsing Right To Kidnap Foreigners For Prosecution In
U.S., Notisur, June 30, 1992, at § Multilateral issues. On June 18, Brazilian For-
eign Minister Celso Lafer condemned the United States' decision as contrary to the
Organization of American States Charter which prohibits intervention in the do-
mestic affairs of foreign nations. Id.
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extraterritorial abductions as a valid means of obtaining juris-
diction over an individual.
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APPENDIX
On December 14, 1992, on remand from the Supreme
Court, Judge Edward Rafeedie of the Central District Court of
California acquitted Alvarez of all charges against him.2 0 7 In
dismissing the case, Judge Rafeedie said "the evidence against
Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, presented during the two
weeks of testimony, had been based on 'hunches' and the
'wildest speculation' and had failed to support the charges that
he had participated in the torture of the drug agent, Enrique
Camarena Salazar."208 Alvarez is now back in Guadalajara,
Mexico. 209
Joseph Miller
207 Seth Mydans, Mexican Doctor Freed in Agent's Killing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16,
1992, at A20.
208 Id.
209 Id.
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